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Over the last ten years, China has become a major trade partner of Kazakh-
stan, investing heavily in the country’s oil and gas sector. Information about 
the Sino-Kazakh cooperation has been scarce, raising many questions about 
the economic, social and environmental risks for the Central Asian country 
and fuelling anti-Chinese sentiment among the local population. Komila 
Nabiyeva reviews the energy cooperation of two countries within the Belt 
and Road Initiative and its implications.
In September 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping 
announced the launch of the country’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) during his visit to Kazakh-
stan. A one trillion US dollars grand plan is set 
to connect Asia, Africa and Europe through mul-
tiple transport corridors and infrastructure pro-
jects on land and at sea. The place for the an-
nouncement had its historical symbolism: over 
2.000  years ago the first Chinese envoy was 
sent “to open the door to friendly contacts be-
tween China and Central Asia as well as the 
transcontinental Silk Road”, according to Xi Jin-
ping. This founding myth has since become part 
of the official BRI narrative (Hoering, 2018, 48).
But the strategic importance of Kazakhstan 
goes beyond its role in the Silk Road. Located in 
the middle of land routes from Western China to 
Europe, the country often refers to itself as the 
‘buckle’1 in the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), 
one of the two BRI pillars. As the strongest 
economy in the region, it has a potential to be-
come a major trans-Eurasian transport and 
logistics hub. Kazakhstan is also a close partner 
of Russia and member of the Russia-led Eura-
sian Economic Union (EEU). At the time of the 
BRI announcement it was the only country in 
the region which could provide access for China 
to the EEU market.
Kazakhstan also borders and has historical and 
cultural ties to China’s largest province of Xin-
jiang. Xinjiang is less economically affluent and 
problematic for China due to regular ethnic ten-
sions with the predominantly Muslim Uighur 
population. Moreover, Kazakhstan has tremen-
dous crude oil and gas resources. It has the 12th 
largest oil reserves in the world and the third 
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largest outside of the members of the Organisa-
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).
Over the last ten years, China has been invest-
ing heavily in Central Asian countries and espe-
cially in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is among the 
world’s top ten recipients of Chinese non-con-
cessional finance (with less than 25 % grant el-
ement), along with Russia, Pakistan, Angola and 
Turkmenistan.2 In 2018, Kazakhstan’s exports 
to China accounted for six billion US dollars and 
imports from China for five billion US dollars 
(total trade turnover of over 11 billion US dol-
lars). Before the slowdown due to the 2014–
2016 oil price plunge, the total trade turnover 
between Kazakhstan and China was even higher, 
reaching over 17 billion of US dollars. As of to-
day, China has steadily caught up with Russia as 
the most important economic partner and has 
become the largest investor in Kazakhstan (see 
table 1).
Kazakhstan responded to the SREB by integrat-
ing its state infrastructure development pro-
gramme ‘Nurly Zhol’ (“A Road to the Future” in 
English) into the BRI. The programme is also 
part of the modernisation strategy ‘Kazakh-
stan-2050’, launched by former President Nur-
sultan Nazarbayev. The strategy should bring 
the country to the top 30 most developed coun-
tries by 2050. The Nurly Zhol investment pro-
gramme of nine billion US dollars is set for the 
period of 2015–2019. According to experts, it 
was driven by the need to cope with the external 
shock to Kazakhstan’s oil-dependent economy 
due to a sharp decline in oil prices since 2014. 
In September 2016, China and Kazakhstan 
signed a joint plan, which officially linked the 
SREB and Nurly Zhol (Bitabarova, 2019, 162).
Controversial relations  
with China
“Chinese business presence is an extremely po-
liticized issue in Kazakhstan”, Sergey Solyanik, 
consultant of the NGO Crude Accountability 
says. “The fact that too little information is 
available on the Chinese cooperation reinforces 
the already existing phobias among the popula-
tion”. Solyanik has been working as an environ-
mental activist in Kazakhstan for over 20 years 
and monitors activities of oil companies and in-
ternational financial institutions operating in 
the country.
The growing influence of China in Central Asia 
over the last years reactivated the old fears and 
clichés, stemming from the Soviet times and 
presenting China as an historical enemy. In Ka-
zakhstan numerous factors exacerbated an-
ti-Chinese sentiment. Back in 1991, China ques-
tioned Kazakhstan’s sovereignty over the terri-
tory, stretching from Semirechye to the Lake 
Balkhash (Peyrouse, 2016, 15). The issues of 
cross-border river management between the 
two countries remain unresolved. The main two 
rivers in Kazakhstan, the Ili and the Irtysh have 
their sources on the Chinese territory. They 
have been subject to pollution and drought due 
to the increased water withdrawal from China. 
China’s repression of Muslim minorities, includ-
Table 1. Kazakhstan’s exports and imports in Millions of US dollars 
(Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics)
Exports to 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
China 9 815 5 480 4 228 5 773 6 240
Russia 6 389 4 548 3 445 4 479 4 979
United States 412 434 613 462 957
Germany 445 343 262 418 463
Imports from 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
China 7 440 5 088 3 668 4 692 5 381
Russia 13 808 10 530 9 288 11 336 11 969
United States 1 999 1 484 1 277 1 253 1 499
Germany 2 327 1 986 1 443 1 479 1 646
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ing ethnic Kazakhs, also damages its reputation 
in Kazakhstan.
There is a striking difference between the posi-
tive narratives of a “win-win cooperation with 
China” among Kazakhstan’s political elites, ben-
efitting and having direct interest in the busi-
ness deals (cf. O’Neill, 2014) and the mistrustful 
as well as partly alarmist reactions among the 
expert circles and the general public to the 
news about Chinese investments. The majority 
of independent experts in Kazakhstan consider 
the expression ‘China’s soft hegemonism’ accu-
rate, when describing the country’s geopolitical 
influence and economic investment. The expres-
sion was proposed by Murat Laumulin, former 
chief researcher of the Kazakhstan Institute for 
Strategic Studies (Peyrouse, 2016, 20).
Discourses on the ‘Chinese expansion’ and ‘in-
vasion’ of Chinese migrants, who will settle and 
take away jobs and women from locals can be 
frequently found in the Kazakh mass and social 
media. Land ownership is a particularly sensi-
tive issue among the local population. In April 
2016, the announcement of the planned amend-
ments to the land law, which would have allowed 
foreigners to rent agricultural land for 25 years 
and land to be sold and leased at auctions, have 
led to numerous protests across Kazakhstan.
Energy cooperation
Oil and gas
Over the last two decades, China has turned 
from an energy sufficient country to a net oil 
and gas importer. The world’s largest economy 
currently accounts for 20 % of the world’s total 
energy consumption and imports over 60 % of 
its crude oil, having overtaken the United States 
as the largest crude oil importer. Increasingly 
worried about its energy security, China has 
been focusing on securing diverse energy sup-
ply chains and alternative transportation routes.
Not surprisingly, Kazakhstan’s major exports to 
China are natural resources, including crude 
oil, natural gas and metals. According to differ-
ent estimates, the share of Chinese companies 
in Kazakhstan’s oil sector varies between 
25 % and 40 %. In 2013, Forbes.kz reported that 
at least 22 Chinese energy companies were ac-
tive in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector with ten 
of them entirely Chinese owned and eight with 
over 50 % Chinese ownership. The largest inves-
tors are the state-owned China National Petro-
leum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical 
Corporation (SINOPEC), China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Petro China 
along with their subsidiaries.
CNPC is the most prominent and one of the old-
est Chinese players in Kazakhstan with stakes 
in local energy companies and involved in 
various upstream and infrastructure develop-
ment projects. In 1997, it bought 60 % and later 
an additional 25 % of shares of Kazakhstan’s 
Aktobemunaigas Corporation, a subsidiary of 
the national energy company KazMunaiGaz 
(KMG). KMG and CNPC jointly constructed the 
Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline, with a capacity 
of 12.5 million tonnes per year. In 2013, CNPC 
acquired an 8.33 % stake in the Kashagan off-
shore project. It was China’s first offshore and 
largest acquisition in the Caspian Sea basin 
(Smith Stegen/ Kusznir, 2015, 102).
Furthermore, Kazakhstan plays an important 
role in the China-Central Asia gas pipeline, the 
first transnational infrastructure project of 
China in the region, spanning across Turkmen-
istan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and linking 
up with Xinjiang at the border of Horgos.
In 2016, following his visit to Beijing, the then 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev an-
nounced cooperation plans with China on 51 
joint enterprises. Meanwhile, Chinese media 
reported on plans to move production capacities 
of 51 plants to Kazakhstan. Both sides revealed 
no details of the planned deals. In its later state-
ments, Kazakh Invest, a national agency aimed 
to attract foreign investment, however, has been 
referring to 51 bilateral industrial projects in 
the mining, engineering and petrochemistry 
sector with the total investment value of 27.7 bil-
lion US dollars.
“This ‘magic’ figure of 51 projects is being often 
quoted by the Kazakhstan’s authorities during 
press briefings. But there is no detailed informa-
tion available on what kind of projects those 
are”, Sergey Solyanik of Crude Accountability 
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says. Silence about the projects on both Chi-
nese and Kazakh official side has created room 
for public speculation and rumours, whether 
those could be China’s old and environmentally 
damaging production capacities.
According to Solyanik, in February 2019, the 
NGO Eco-Forum of Kazakhstan sent a request 
to the Kazakh Minister of Industry and Infra-
structure Development, asking for details of 
the 51 joint projects. It received no reply. In 
March 2019, several environmental organisa-
tions, including Crude Accountability, sent sep-
arate letters to the Prime Minister of Kazakh-
stan and to the Chinese Embassy in the country, 
asking for details of the projects.
Meanwhile, according to Bitabarova (2019, 
168) there was a change in the use of language 
in the official BRI discourse from the term “in-
dustrial transfers from China” to “industrial 
capacity cooperation”. This indicates attempts 
on both sides to avoid the negative image and 
speculation, whether China moves its outdated 
and harmful industrial capacities to Kazakh-
stan.
Nuclear
Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of 
uranium. The national uranium producing com-
pany Kazatomprom signed strategic coopera-
tion agreements with China’s General Nuclear 
Corporation and China National Nuclear Cor-
poration in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Since 
then several bilateral agreements were signed 
on uranium supply and fuel fabrication as well 
as uranium mining joint ventures. Kazatom-
prom and China General Nuclear Corporation 
agreed to create a joint venture for nuclear fuel 
fabrication, which is due to start operation by 
the end of 2019. In 2014, Kazatomprom an-
nounced that 55 % of the produced uranium 
was exported to China.3
Renewables
Despite its investments in oil and gas, China 
has also been investing heavily in clean renew-
able energy technologies. This has been the 
case largely due to growing concerns over the 
impacts of air pollution and the rapidly increas-
ing profitability of renewables. In 2017, China 
accounted for almost 50 % of the world’s new 
investments in renewable energy.4 However, 
renewable energy investment has been playing 
an extremely marginal role in the overall BRI 
projects. According to the recent World Re-
sources Institute (WRI) report, over 60 % of en-
ergy-sector loans by Chinese development 
banks and over 90 % of energy-sector invest-
ments by the state-owned Silk Road Fund and 
state-owned enterprises in the period from 
2014 to 2017 were in fossil fuels (WRI, 2018).
‘The green economy’ has been a buzz phrase in 
Kazakhstan ever since President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev unveiled his strategy to modernise 
the economy in 2012. Under his plan, the share 
of renewable sources in electricity generation 
should increase from 1 % today to 3 % by 2020, 
to 10 % by 2030 and to 50 % by 2050. In sum-
mer 2017, Kazakhstan hosted a World Expo un-
der the slogan ‘Future Energy’ in an attempt to 
improve the international image of the country, 
and to attract investors and high technology.
Both China and Kazakhstan proclaim to have 
green ambitions. Both have government com-
mitments on reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions and targets on deployment of renewable 
energy. Yet, so far no joint projects in the re-
newable energy sector were announced or im-
plemented in the framework of the BRI.
According to the above-mentioned WRI report, 
privately owned Chinese enterprises drive most 
of cross-border investment in renewable energy 
(65 % of them invest in renewables). But foreign 
private companies, interested in investment in 
renewables in Kazakhstan, face numerous ad-
ministrative barriers (Nabiyeva, 2018). These 
barriers also apply for Chinese private investors, 
who do not enjoy the backing and support that 
the state-owned fossil fuel corporations have.
As a result, nearly all utility-scale renewable 
energy projects realized to date in Kazakhstan 
were only possible due to the backing of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD). They include the 50 MW 
Burnoye Solar-1 in the southern Kazakhstan, 
and the 50 MW wind power park near the cap-
ital Astana. In 2018, Chinese solar manufac-
Blickwechsel | April 2019 Page 5
turer JinkoSolar Holding announced it will sup-
ply 50 MW of solar photovoltaic (PV) modules 
for the Burnoye-2 project, financed by the 
EBRD. Another Chinese solar PV modules pro-
ducer Risen Energy received the financial back-
ing of the EBRD, Green Climate Fund and Clean 
Technology Fund to build a 40 MW solar PV 
plant in the north of the country and a 50 MW 
solar PV plant in southern Kazakhstan in 
2018 and 2019 respectively.
Implications and  
risks of Chinese cooperation
In April 2018, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) warned China to “beware of financing un-
needed and unsustainable projects in countries 
with heavy debt burdens”.5 Later, a study by a 
US consultancy found that 32 % of the BRI pro-
jects, worth 419 billion US dollars, have run into 
“trouble”, such as performance delays, public 
opposition, and national security controversies.6
Chinese loans and business deals have been a 
subject of criticism for the lack of transparency 
on the contractual terms and conditions, lack of 
visible corporate social responsibility as well as 
non-respect for the environment and human 
rights. Several of these issues concerning Chi-
nese cooperation are particularly relevant in the 
case of Kazakhstan.
Political and economic dependence
In contrast to the Western financial assistance, 
Chinese loans are known to come without con-
ditions on political and economic reforms, such 
as strengthening human rights, good govern-
ance and economic liberalization. This has led 
to the criticism that Chinese loans indirectly 
encourage retention of problematic investment 
environment, poor rule of law and endemic cor-
ruption in recipient countries.
In fact, bilateral agreements and deals con-
cluded to date with Kazakhstan demonstrate 
that China’s main interest in Kazakhstan is as a 
stable and close source of natural resources to 
foster China’s economic growth. Nearly all Chi-
nese investment in Kazakhstan is by state-
owned enterprises. It is therefore in China’s 
interest to have a stable political leadership in 
Kazakhstan. High levels of corruption.7 weak 
checks on the executive branch, and lack of 
transparency in Kazakhstan help China to se-
cure its deals. In return, Chinese loans expand 
the resources available for the Kazakh govern-
ment to maintain economic stability and to en-
sure the necessary support from the elites and 
public to be able to stay in power (O’Neill, 2014, 
147).
Meanwhile, Chinese financial assistance is not 
free of conditionality. Since China is not a mem-
ber of the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), it is not obliged 
to report on its aid-granting processes and con-
ditions. This leaves a lot of room for opaque 
trade-offs with recipient countries. In the past, 
China often provided foreign governments with 
loans in exchange for the right to extract their 
natural resources. This fosters the phenomenon 
of ‘predatory aid’, which captures foreign re-
sources and subjugates recipient countries by 
locking them into the role of raw material ex-
porters (Laruelle, 2018, xi).
Indeed, about three quarters of Kazakhstan’s 
and Central Asian exports to China are raw ma-
terials, petrol, ferrous and nonferrous metals. 
At the same time, about 90 % of Chinese exports 
to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian coun-
tries include finished goods, such as consumer 
products, high-tech, pharmaceuticals and auto-
mobile parts (Peyrouse, 2015, 17). Kazakhstan 
made efforts in the past to diversify traded prod-
ucts and improve coordination of certification 
Graph 1. 
Railway connec-
tions and oil 
and gas pipe-
lines in Central 
Asia, connected 
to China. 
Source: Geopo-
litical Intelli-
gence Service, 
2017.
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policies, but without much effect. Currently, oil 
accounts for about 60 % of Kazakhstan’s total 
exports and used to account for a quarter8 of the 
country’s GDP.
Apart from cementing Kazakhstan’s depend-
ency on raw material exports, Chinese cooper-
ation also does not necessarily contribute to 
higher economic growth, business development 
and employment. Worldwide, Chinese firms are 
involved as contractors in almost 90 % of pro-
jects financed by China (Hoering, 2018, 39). 
Therefore, a large share of Chinese funding 
supports the country’s own economic develop-
ment. A loan granted by a Chinese bank is rein-
vested in the Chinese company that gets the 
contract, which brings Chinese equipment and 
a Chinese workforce to implement the project 
(Laruelle, 2018, xi). Therefore, it remains to be 
seen if the promises of Kazakhstan’s govern-
ment to create over 20,000 new jobs for the 
local population in the planned 51 joint projects 
will be realized.
China’s loans also contribute to a debt spiral. In 
the neighbouring countries of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan Chinese loans already account for 
about 40 % and 50 % of the public debt respec-
tively. Such dependency raises big concerns 
about possible trade-offs for the repayment of 
Chinese credits. According to Kazakh sources, 
loans from China accounted for about 7 % of the 
total public debt in 2017 (see table 1). However 
there are indications that the real value of the 
debt is being underrated to avoid public criti-
cism (cf. O’Neill, 2014).
Environmental and human rights
“One of the biggest problems is that Kazakh au-
thorities do not make a strategic environmental 
assessment of the planned large projects in the 
country. There are no information and public 
hearings for Chinese projects, although Kazakh-
stan is a signatory of the Aarhus Convention”, 
Sergey Solyanik of Crude Accountability says. 
Lack of transparency and information on Chi-
nese business deals and loans also raise social 
and environmental risks such as environmental 
pollution, lack of compensation to local popula-
tion, human rights violations and poor working 
conditions.
A prime example is the case of the Kenkiyak vil-
lage in the western Aktobe region of Kazakh-
stan. About 5,000 people live next to the crude 
oil deposit, which has been exploited since 
1960s. For the last twenty years, it has been 
exploited by the Chinese state-owned oil corpo-
ration CNPC.
“In summer, the majority of the Kenkiyak popu-
lation does not get drinking water, although 
there is a fresh water deposit about 20 km away. 
Experts believe that the lack of water most 
probably has to do with the water intake of the 
CNPC-Aktobemunaigas to keep pressure in the 
oil deposit,” Sergey Solyanik says. According to 
the media reports, the local village population 
suffers from regular emissions of hydrogen sul-
phide, and the rates of cardiovascular diseases 
and cancer in the village have increased dra-
matically.9
CNPC does not respond to requests and letters 
from the local village population. “That is a dis-
tinctive feature of the CNPC management. They 
never contact local people. They are in contact 
only with the [local] authorities. Even the hotel 
for shift workers, built by CNPC in Kenkiyak, is 
separated into two parts by a high fence. There 
is one entry for Chinese managers and another 
one for Kazakh. They never intersect,” one Ken-
kiyak resident told the journalists of “Uralskaya 
nedelya”.10
Table 2. China’s loans as reported by Kazakhstan, in millions of US dollars 
(Source: Laruelle, 2018, viii)
2014 2015 2016 2017
Kazakhstan’s total debt 157,062 153,456 163,758 167,890
Loans from China 15,969 13,248 12,589 11,975
Share of loans from China 
in total debt
10 % 9 % 8 % 7 %
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Future outlook
Most experts on Central Asia agree that through 
the BRI China will remain the largest investor 
in the region. The country can mobilize more 
investment than Russia and the Western coun-
tries are offering (cf. Laruelle, 2018). Engage-
ment in the BRI is a turning point in the region’s 
post-Soviet history and an important factor for 
its social and economic development. Yet, in-
vestments in infrastructure and energy by them-
selves do not necessarily lead to economic 
growth. For that the respective governments 
should assess the long-term sustainability of the 
projects.
By aligning its Nurly Zhol investment pro-
gramme with the SREB, Kazakhstan has proved 
to be willing to affect the course of China’s 
‘game’ (cf. Bitabarova, 2019). But to ensure the 
sustainable economic growth in the country and 
true “win-win” cooperation, the Kazakh govern-
ment should leverage Chinese investment to 
develop its own manufacturing and services sec-
tors, to enable knowledge transfer and to create 
local jobs. Between 2014 and 2016, the Kazakh 
government have experienced first-hand that oil 
and gas-dependent economies are extremely 
vulnerable to external price shocks. It learned 
that the diversification of economy would be a 
key solution.
A crucial step, which would help both Kazakh-
stan and China to gain public support for their 
bilateral cooperation, would be ensuring trans-
parency and public access to information on 
joint agreements and Chinese loans. Scrutiny of 
the planned projects by civil society and through 
public hearings would also provide necessary 
checks and balances.
Both China and Kazakhstan have commitments 
on tackling climate change and need action to 
prove words. Moreover, China is interested in 
improving its reputation as a development part-
ner both in Kazakhstan and internationally. In-
troducing and encouraging renewable energy 
cooperation into the BRI strategy would help to 
achieve this goal. Kazakhstan would need to im-
prove the investment environment and address 
numerous administrative barriers that currently 
hinder private foreign and local investment in 
the Kazakh renewable energy sector. The tran-
sition to renewables could be a shortcut to the 
top 30 developed countries for Kazakhstan.
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